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FEDERAL COURTS-CHOICE oF LAw-.APPLICATION OF FEDERAL LAW 
To GOVERNMENT StmcoNTRAcr IN FEDERAL DIVERSITY CASE - Defendant 
obtained a government missile contract, and plaintiff was subcontracted 
to manufacture containers for the missiles. When certain changes in 
elements of the containers were ordered by the Government, plaintiff 
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demanded an "equitable adjustment" from defendant pursuant to the 
terms of the subcontract. Defendant paid only the costs of effecting 
the necessary changes. Plaintiff instituted this suit in federal district 
court alleging diversity of citizenship and demanding that the adjustment 
include, as allowed by California law, compensation for overhead losses 
caused by a partial work stoppage during the delay in effecting the 
changes. The district court characterized the contract as a government 
contract, held that federal rather than state law applied, and found for 
defendant on the merits.1 On appeal, held, affirmed. Although the 
subcontract cannot be characterized as a government contract, federal 
law should be applied for its interpretation since the federal interest in 
national security requires a uniform federal rule for the construction of 
such government subcontracts. American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961). 
The doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins2 is that state law applies to 
actions in the federal courts, "except where the Constitution or treaties 
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide."3 
The express exception4 to the rule has been found to include: suits 
involving rights or obligations of the government on its commercial 
instruments5 or contracts,6 suits involving the rights or obligations 
created by government instruments as between private parties,7 and suits 
in which the policy of federal statutes requires a uniform federal rule 
governing the transactions which they affect.8 Until this decision it 
1 186 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1960) • 
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
8 Federal Rules of Decision Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958): "The laws of the 
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts 
of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil 
actions in the federal courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 
4 See Comment, Erie Limited: The Confines of State Law in the Federal Courts, 40 
CORNELL L.Q. 561 (1955) ; Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of 
Federal Common Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1946) • 
5 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). For a discussion of the 
questionable constitutional basis for this rule, see Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field of 
Federal Common Law, 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 991 (1953). 
6 Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947) ("general contract law" 
applied without even considering state law) • 
7 Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 27 (1956). It is interesting that the Court 
held that federal law applied only to the rights created by the bonds, and that the 
issue of burden of proof of good faith of defendants in presenting the bonds was held 
to be controlled by state law. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction: Law Applicable to Govern-
ment Instruments, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 212 (1957) • 
s In Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942), it was held that the 
question of whether a patent licensee was estopped to deny the validity of his licensor's 
patent and avoid a price-fixing agreement was governed by federal law because of 
federal anti-trust policy; and in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), 
federal law was held applicable to determine the validity of a note given to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation as part of a surreptitious scheme because of the strong 
policy of the statutes creating that agency to protect it from fraud. 
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had been accepted as settled that suits between private parties to govern-
ment subcontracts were within the Erie rule and that state law would 
be applied;9 but the court's opinion makes it clear that it regards this 
case to be within the federal-policy category of the exception. However, 
the prior cases within that category involved statutes or policies of 
statutes which went to the merits of the controversy,10 and it is difficult 
to find any federal statutes which touch upon the construction of equi-
table adjustment provisions in government subcontracts, or which express 
a controlling federal policy necessitating a uniform federal rule in this 
situation. The court referred to the probability that the prime contract 
provided for an equitable adjustment, which might reflect the adjustment 
made under the subcontract thereby increasing the cost of national 
security. Although the court adverted to the policy of Congress to reduce 
the cost of defense, which is manifested in the Renegotiation Act,11 
it is apparent that the policy of the Renegotiation Act does not bear upon 
the construction or effect of the equitable adjustment provision of the 
subcontract. The act merely provides that contracts and subcontracts 
let under the authority of certain government agencies shall be subject 
to review after performance in order that excessive profits may be elim-
inated. Since this suit was instituted for compensation of losses, the 
considerations of a review to ascertain excessive profits seems somewhat 
remote from the issue being determined. Furthermore, under the act 
the function of determining excessiveness of profits is not delegated to 
the courts but rather is invested in the Renegotiation Board appointed 
by the President whose findings are subject only to redetermination by 
the Tax Court.12 Since nothing in the act bears upon the issue under 
consideration, and no other statutes or manifestations of federal policy are 
suggested by the court to require the uniformity urged by the defendant, 
o Ogden Elec. Co. v. Engineers Ltd., 151 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1945); Cuneo, Disputes 
Between Subcontractors and Prime Contractors Under Government Contracts, 16 Fm. 
B.J. 246, 259-61 (1956); Steele, Choice of Law, State or Federal in Government Sub-
contracts, id. at 202. The general rule also appears to be applicable to suits brought 
under the Miller Act, 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270d (1958) • Uaited 
States ex rel. Lichter v. Henke Constr. Co., 157 F.2d 13 (8th Cir. 1946); United States 
ex rel. Gillioz v. John Kerns Constr. Co., 50 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Ark. 1943), rev'd. on 
other grounds, 140 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1944). But see Liebman v. United States ex rel. 
California Elec. Supply Co., 153 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1946); United States ex rel. Glickfeld 
v. Krendel, 136 F. Supp. 276 (D.N.J. 1955); United States ex rel. Hargis v. Maryland 
Cas. Co., 64 F. Supp. 522 (S.D. Cal. 1946) . 
10 The language of many of the decisions suggests that the presence of a "federal 
question" is the basis for the choice of law decision. See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson 
Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942); D'Oench, Duhme &: Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456 
(1942); Mitchell v. Flintkote Co., 185 F.2d 1008, 1011 (2d Cir. 1951). 
11 Renegotiation Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 7, as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. §§ 1211-33 
(1958). 
12 Renegotiation Act of 1951, § 108, 65 Stat. 21, as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 1218 
(1958). 
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there is little to support the application of federal law in this case 
except the statement of the court that federal interests are involved 
which require the protection of federal law.1a 
Assuming that the "accident" of diversity had been missing from this 
case, the suit probably would have been brought in a California court, 
since no federal question, under the rule of Gully v. First National Bank,14 
would have been presented to confer original jurisdiction upon the 
federal district court.15 In the absence of a "federal question" the state 
court would have applied its own law, not federal law,16 and the outcome 
of the suit might well have been reversed. The avoidance of just such 
a divergence between state and federal rules of decision within the 
same geographical area was the prime motivation behind the Erie doc-
trine.17 Likewise, the major reason for conflict of laws rules is that fair-
ness to the parties requires that the outcome of litigation should not be 
substantially affected by the choice of forum in which the suit is decided.18 
Furthermore, suits brought under the Miller Act, dealing with certain 
13 A similar interest was suggested as a basis for the application of federal law in a 
tort suit by the government against one who had injured a soldier. United States v. 
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) • 
14 299 U .s. 109 (1936) • 
15 But see Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question,'' 16 TuL. L. REv. 362 
(1942). 
16 This is graphically indicated by the federal-state split on the meaning and effect 
of Exec. Order 9001, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787 (1941), as amended, Exec. Order 9296, 8 Fed. 
Reg. 1429 (1943) , which provided that government contractors shall not use contingent 
fee agents to procure their contracts and shall warrant in their contracts that such 
agents have not been used. The federal courts which have considered claims by such 
agents for compensation under contingent fee contracts have uniformly held such con-
tracts void and unenforceable. Le John Mfg. Co. v. Webb, 222 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1955); 
Mitchell v. Flintkote Co., 185 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1951); Bradley v. American Radiator 
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 159 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Browne v. R. & R. Eng"r Co., 
164 F. Supp. 315 (D. Del. 1958) , rev'd on other grounds, 264 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1959); 
Weitzel v. Brown-Neil Corp., 152 F. Supp. 540 (D.W.Va. 1957), afj'd, 251 F.2d 681 (4th 
Cir. 1958); Ballard v. Tingue Mills, 128 F. Supp. 683 (D. Conn. 1954) . At the same 
time the state courts, with near unanimity, have construed the Executive order as merely 
providing a penalty against contractors for breach of the required warranty and 
have allowed enforcement of the claims of such agents. Buckley v. Coyne Elec. School, 
Inc., 343 Ill. App. 420, 99 N.E.2d 370 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 927 (1952); Gendron 
v. Jacoby, 337 Mich. 150, 59 N.W .2d 128 (1953); Ebeling v. F. J. Swaine Mfg. Co., 
357 Mo. 549, 209 S.W.2d 892 (1948); A. H. Haeseler Bldg. & Contracting Co. v. John 
J. Dupps Co., 129 N.E.2d 383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954). But see Federal Pac. Elec. Co. v. 
McAdams, 207 Misc. 525, 139 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. City Ct. 1955). See Annot., Duty of 
State Courts To Follow Dedsions of Federal Courts, Other Than the Supreme Court, 
on Federal Questions, 147 A.L.R. 857 (1943). 
17 See Mr. Justice Brandeis' majority opinion, 304 U.S. 64, 71-80 (1938). The 
doctrine of Erie was held to apply to suits in equity in Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. 
Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938). In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), 
it was held that federal courts must also apply the conflict of laws rules of the states 
in which they sit. 
18 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 4 (3d ed. 1949). 
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types of government subcontracts,19 may present the same federal interest 
in national security which is here involved, and yet Congress has seen 
fit to allow state law to apply in those cases.20 Since there is no clearly 
defined federal statutory policy which requires a uniform federal rule 
applicable to this case, and the Rules of Decision Act21 appears to require 
the application of state law in the absence of such a clearly defined 
federal policy, it would seem that, congressional intent also militates 
against this expansion of the exception to the Erie doctrine. 
H. C. Snyder, Jr. 
10 Under 49 Stat. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270b (a) (1958), "every person who has 
furnished labor or material" is given the right to sue contractors covered by § 270 (a) • 
§ 270b (b) provides: "Every suit instituted under this section shall be brought in the 
name of the United States for the use of the person suing, in the United States District 
Court for any district in which the contract was to be performed and executed and not 
elsewhere, irrespective of the amount in controversy in such suit .••• " 
20 See cases cited note 9 supra, indicating that state law has been applied in deter-
mining rights and obligations under these contracts with more than twenty-five years 
of congressional acquiescence. 
21 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1958) • 
